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ABSTRACT—Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the procedures 
necessary for corporations to reorganize. To ensure that the bankruptcy 
process and proposed reorganization plan are fair, Chapter 11 mandates 
that certain requirements are met before confirmation of a reorganization 
plan can be achieved. Section 1129(a)(10) represents one of those 
requirements. Specifically, § 1129(a)(10) requires at least one impaired 
class of claims to vote in favor of the reorganization plan in order for it to 
be confirmed. Applying § 1129(a)(10) is relatively simple in bankruptcy 
proceedings involving a single debtor; however, its application is much 
more complicated in bankruptcy proceedings involving multiple debtors. 
As multi-debtor bankruptcy proceedings have become increasingly 
common, courts have begun to debate whether § 1129(a)(10) requires an 
impaired class from each debtor to vote in favor of a proposed 
reorganization plan in a jointly administered, multi-debtor Chapter 11 
proceeding, or whether it requires only one impaired class from across all 
debtors to vote in favor of it. The former option is known as the 
“per-debtor” approach, and the latter as the “per-plan” approach. This 
Comment argues for the adoption of the per-debtor approach. In particular, 
it urges that the per-debtor approach more accurately aligns with the plain 
meaning and statutory construction of Chapter 11, more closely follows the 
purpose and underlying safeguards at work within the Bankruptcy Code, 
and better serves the interests and rights of the parties involved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global economic crisis over the last several years has served as a 
stark reminder of the central role federal bankruptcy law plays in today’s 
corporate world. Although the number of corporate bankruptcy filings fell 
in the last two years,1 2012 and 2013 still observed several large 
bankruptcies, including Eastman Kodak, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
Publishers, and Hostess Brands.2 These large bankruptcy proceedings 
underscore the importance of federal bankruptcy law as well as the 
frequency with which bankruptcy law affects business.3 
U.S. bankruptcy law is designed to benefit both debtors and creditors. 
Debtors emerge from bankruptcy with a fresh start, and creditors recover a 
portion, if not all, of their investments.4 Bankruptcy is meant to provide 
 
1 Adam Belz, Bankruptcy Filings Drop to Lowest Levels Since 2008, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), 
Nov. 8, 2012, at D1; Bankruptcy Filings Drop 12 Percent in Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 24, 
2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/bankruptcy-filings-drop-12-percent-fiscal-year-2013 (noting that for the 
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, bankruptcy filings were down 12% from fiscal year 
2012).  
2 Tom Hals, U.S. Bankruptcies on Pace to Fall to Pre-2008 Level, REUTERS, Jul. 5, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-bankruptcy-stats-decline-idUSBRE8640UB20120705. 
3 See Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980–2012), AM. BANKR. INST., 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=65139&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (presenting bankruptcy filing statistics by year 
from 1980 to 2012). 
4 See Daniel R. Wong, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract 
Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1928 (2012); see also Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (finding that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a 
fresh start); Michael Bentley Guss, Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between Federal 
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debtors with a single forum in which they can quickly and efficiently sort 
out their affairs.5 The reality, however, is that many bankruptcies result in 
lengthy and expensive litigation.6 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses corporate 
reorganizations. It requires a bankrupt firm to create a plan of 
reorganization that restructures the financial claims against it so that it may 
continue operating as a going concern.7 Under a reorganization plan, 
similar claims to the firm’s assets are grouped into classes based on certain 
claim characteristics, such as priority.8 The plan must propose a treatment 
for each class—that is, identify what each class will receive in return for 
their prebankruptcy claims.9 If the plan alters a class’s legal, equitable, or 
contractual rights, then that class is considered impaired.10 Once proposed, 
a reorganization plan can be confirmed in two ways: consensually, if all 
classes have accepted the plan;11 or nonconsensually, over the dissent of an 
impaired class if all of the Bankruptcy Code’s requirements under 
§ 1129(a) have been met, except for § 1129(a)(8).12 Nonconsensual 
confirmation is generally referred to as a “cramdown.”13 
Because Chapter 11 proceedings are often large and complex, courts 
have allowed certain administrative rules of convenience to be used to 
facilitate the management of these proceedings. Joint administration and 
substantive consolidation are two of these rules. Joint administration allows 
closely related debtors, such as subsidiaries and affiliated companies, to file 
joint bankruptcy petitions.14 By moving for joint administration, all closely 
related debtors are able to have their bankruptcy petitions administered by 
 
Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1985) (“[T]he 
creditors will receive at least part of the debt owed to them.”).  
5 See Wong, supra note 4, at 1928–29. 
6 See id. at 1929. The average Chapter 11 proceeding lasts more than two years with estimated 
direct costs of approximately 6.5% of the debtor’s book value of assets. See Edith S. Hotchkiss et al., 
Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE 
FINANCE 235, 260, 262 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008).  
7 See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 6, at 242. 
8 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012) (“[A] plan may place a claim or an interest in a 
particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of 
such class.”). 
9 See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 6, at 242. 
10 See § 1124(1); In re PPI Enters., 324 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Each creditor has a set of 
legal, equitable, and contractual rights that may or may not be affected by bankruptcy. If the debtor’s 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan does not leave the creditor’s rights entirely ‘unaltered,’ the creditor’s 
claim will be labeled as impaired under § 1124(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
11 See § 1129(a). Any class that is not impaired is deemed to have accepted the plan. See § 1126(f). 
12 See § 1129(b); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. 523, 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).  
13 See Armstrong, 320 B.R. at 532; Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward 
Removing Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1995).  
14 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015. 
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the same court.15 In theory, joint administration does not alter the 
Bankruptcy Code’s requirements in any way—each debtor’s estate is still 
considered separate and distinct.16 Substantive consolidation, in contrast, 
allows a bankruptcy court to combine the estates of multiple debtors and to 
force each debtor’s creditors to become creditors in a consolidated estate.17 
Unlike joint administration, substantive consolidation does alter the 
Bankruptcy Code’s requirements.18 
Although both rules promote efficiency in bankruptcy proceedings, 
each serves a distinct purpose. This distinction, however, has become 
blurred in the context of § 1129(a)(10). Section 1129(a)(10), one of the 
requirements for confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, provides 
that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the [proposed reorganization] 
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan [must have] 
accepted the plan.”19 Generally, § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement is simple: Did 
at least one impaired class under the debtor’s proposed reorganization plan 
vote in favor of it? If so, then § 1129(a)(10) is satisfied. When joint 
administration and substantive consolidation are used, however, the 
application of § 1129(a)(10) becomes less clear. Because joint 
administration inevitably involves multiple debtors, the underlying 
difficulty with § 1129(a)(10) is this: Does § 1129(a)(10) require an 
impaired class from each debtor involved in the jointly administered 
Chapter 11 proceeding to vote in favor of the proposed plan, or does it 
require only one impaired class from across all debtors to vote in favor of 
the plan? The former option is known as the “per-debtor” approach, and the 
latter as the “per-plan” approach.20 
As the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware noted in In re 
Tribune Co., the lack of clarity surrounding the appropriate interpretation 
of § 1129(a)(10) has led courts to differing interpretations in jointly 
administered proceedings, with some courts adopting the per-debtor 
approach and others adopting the per-plan approach.21 This disparity is 
significant because a court’s interpretation of this provision can have a 
substantial impact on how Chapter 11 reorganization plans are negotiated 
 
15 See id. Advisory Committee’s Notes. 
16 See Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Joint administration 
does not affect the substantive rights of either the debtor or his or her creditors.”). 
17 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005). 
18 See Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern Trend, 14 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 527, 527 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“As a consequence [of substantive consolidation], 
claimants can no longer recover on their claims from their original obligors; rather, claimants recover 
their ratable share of a common ‘hotchpot’ consisting of the combined assets of the consolidated 
entities.”). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
20 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 180 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
21 Id. at 180–82. 
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and structured. Traditionally, proposed reorganization plans for jointly 
administered Chapter 11 proceedings contain just one plan for all debtors. 
However, if each debtor is required to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) in its own 
right, as is required by the per-debtor approach, then this structure no 
longer works. Debtors will instead be forced to restructure their proposed 
plans to account for each debtor’s individual creditors. 
Likewise, this judicial determination of whether to apply the per-
debtor or per-plan approach can also have a serious impact on the 
availability of plan confirmation through a cramdown. A cramdown refers 
to a court’s ability to confirm a plan proponent’s, or a debtor-in-
possession’s,22 proposed plan of reorganization over a creditor’s 
objection.23 It is a “powerful remedy available to plan proponents.”24 
Section 1129(a)(10) is an important safeguard for creditors because it 
requires some measure of support from impaired creditors before a plan can 
be confirmed over their objections.25 If a per-debtor approach is used, then 
each debtor must obtain the consent of an impaired creditor. If a per-plan 
approach is used, however, then a single consenting impaired class can 
provide the necessary vote to enable the cramdown of a plan on all 
creditors who have claims not just against that impaired class’s debtor, but 
also against all other debtors involved in the jointly administered 
bankruptcy proceeding. This is a dramatic result, particularly given the 
important role voting plays in Chapter 11 proceedings. An impaired 
creditor’s vote is its most powerful tool during bankruptcy, and adopting a 
per-plan approach discredits the value of that vote. This makes clarity 
regarding § 1129(a)(10) quite valuable. 
Because the In re Tribune Co. decision only recently shed light on and 
challenged the application of § 1129(a)(10) in jointly administered Chapter 
11 proceedings, very little has been written about this issue.26 This 
Comment helps fill that void. After reviewing relevant case law and the 
underlying rationale for the two approaches, this Comment argues for the 
adoption of the per-debtor approach. The per-debtor approach accurately 
 
22 A debtor automatically assumes the “debtor in possession” identity once it files a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11, or, in an involuntary case, once an order for relief has been entered. 
§ 1101(1). A debtor-in-possession retains possession of its assets while in Chapter 11. This debtor-in-
possession status continues until a reorganization plan is confirmed, the bankruptcy case is dismissed or 
converted, or a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed. See § 1104(a) (discussing the limited circumstances in 
which a trustee can be appointed to manage the debtor’s affairs); id. §§ 1107–08 (discussing the rights 
and powers of the debtor-in-possession). 
23 A bankruptcy court receives its cramdown powers from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 
§ 1129(b)(1). 
24 See In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
25 See, e.g., Michael Chaisanguanthum, Charter: The Most Important Recent Bankruptcy Decision 
for Secured Creditors, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 9, 14 (2010). 
26 For a discussion of these issues, see id. 
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aligns with the statutory construction of Chapter 11, more closely follows 
the purpose and underlying safeguards implied within the Bankruptcy Code 
than the per-plan approach does (particularly in regard to cramdowns), and 
better serves the interests and rights of the parties involved. Adopting the 
per-debtor approach would also provide greater predictability and fairness 
to Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings by clearly indicating to parties their 
respective rights. 
Part I of this Comment reviews the background of bankruptcy courts, 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and § 1129(a)(10). Part II discusses relevant case 
law and illustrates how the debate over the proper interpretation of 
§ 1129(a)(10) has developed. Part III argues for the adoption of the per-
debtor approach. 
I. UNDERSTANDING CHAPTER 11 AND § 1129(a)(10) 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
“establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”27 Using this power, Congress created a federal bankruptcy 
system. In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978), which completely overhauled prior federal 
bankruptcy law.28 When drafting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Congress recognized that resuscitating failing companies is often beneficial 
to society, which is why the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 put greater 
emphasis on ensuring debtors received a fresh start after exiting 
bankruptcy.29 It also provided debtors with a single forum in which they 
could sort out their affairs: the bankruptcy court.30 Commonly referred to as 
the “Bankruptcy Code,” this piece of legislation continues to govern all 
bankruptcy cases in the United States today.31 
 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
28 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11 and 28 U.S.C.). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 
544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1–1255 (1976)). The previous major revision of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840. 
29 As stated by the Report of the House Judiciary Committee, “[T]he bill continues to recognize the 
States’ interest in regulating credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh 
start.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. Providing a 
fresh start for a debtor after bankruptcy involves “releasing the debtor from further collection attempts 
by creditors and allowing the debtor to retain certain property necessary for [its] return to a normal 
life.” John W. Draskovic, United States v. Security Industrial Bank: A Final Determination of the 
Retrospectivity of Section 522(f)(2), 10 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 573, 573 (1983).  
30 BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 41 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).  
31 See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931. 
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is further recognized for its 
creation of a robust business reorganization section: Chapter 11.32 Chapter 
11 outlines the procedures necessary for businesses to reorganize. It 
attempts to “strike a balance between the need of a corporate debtor in 
financial hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to 
preserve creditors’ and stockholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest 
extent possible.”33 Put more simply, Chapter 11 is designed to benefit both 
debtors and creditors by providing relief to debtors and protection to 
creditors.34 Embodied within Chapter 11 is the policy that “it is generally 
preferable to enable a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize or sell 
its business as a going concern rather than simply to liquidate a troubled 
business.”35 This policy, which again emphasizes the resuscitation of 
businesses, assumes that the continued operation of a bankrupt business 
generates greater value than liquidation.36 The primary goal of any Chapter 
11 case is to confirm a reorganization plan that will enable the bankrupt 
company to emerge with a new capital structure, to return to profitability, 
and to eliminate the debt overhang problem that initially forced it into 
bankruptcy.37 
 
32 See id.; see also Richard M. Cieri, et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to 
Confirm a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part I), 3 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 3, 3 (1993) (“Chapter 11 reorganization has become one of the most valuable sanctuaries ever 
available to businesses facing seemingly insurmountable financial and legal problems.”). 
33 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization: A Survey of Changes. III, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 398, 405 (1938) (“The problem of 
reorganization is primarily a problem of how a failing debtor may be made economically sound and at 
the same time the rights, insofar as they exist, of the creditors and stockholders be preserved under a 
fair arrangement.”).  
34 This differs from prior bankruptcy law, which focused primarily on creditor recovery as opposed 
to debtor relief. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) (discussing the history of bankruptcy laws in the United States 
and how the debtor and creditor rights changed over time). 
35 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4; see also Wong, supra note 4, 
at 1931. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, unlike in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the business ceases operations 
and sells all of its assets. The proceeds are then distributed to its creditors with any residual amount 
returned to shareholders and owners. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 700.01, at 700-2 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013). A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is known as a liquidation 
bankruptcy and is used when an individual or corporation is unable to continue as a going concern. 
36 See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931–32; see also Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 4–5 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“A Congressionally favored alternative to liquidating a business, . . . Chapter 
11 contemplates . . . that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated 
business than if sold for scrap.”). 
37 See Wong, supra note 4, at 1932; see also Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[S]uccessful completion of the reorganization process allows 
a debtor, burdened with the weight of oppressive indebtedness, to restructure its financial obligations, 
discharge its pre-existing debt, and emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital structure that better 
reflects financial reality.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re 
Prudential Lines Inc.), 928 F.2d. 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] paramount and important goal of 
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A. Confirmation of a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 requires the creation and confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization. A plan of reorganization operates as a contract between the 
debtor, its creditors, and its equity holders.38 Section 1123(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code outlines the various components that must be included in 
a reorganization plan.39 It is purposefully limited to seven items. By 
limiting the number of components required in a plan of reorganization, 
Congress ensured that Chapter 11 would remain flexible and capable of 
accommodating many different types of arrangements.40 This flexibility is 
also designed to “foster[] meaningful negotiations between management, 
creditors, and stockholders regarding the terms of any plan.”41 
Once a plan of reorganization is proposed, the plan proponent 
(generally, the debtor-in-possession or its trustee) must solicit creditor 
approval.42 Creditors indicate their approval or disapproval of a proposed 
reorganization plan by voting.43 Although all creditors are technically able 
to vote, in practice only impaired creditors actually exercise their right to 
vote because unimpaired creditors are presumed to have voted in favor of 
the proposed reorganization plan.44 An impaired creditor’s right to vote is 
its most powerful tool in the bankruptcy process.45 It is its bargaining chip 
 
Chapter 11 is the rehabilitation of the debtor by offering breathing space and an opportunity to 
rehabilitate its business and eventually generate revenue.” (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 121 B.R. 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 923 F.2d. 26 (2d 
Cir. 1991))). 
38 In re Pettibone Corp., 134 B.R. 349, 351–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (“A plan of reorganization is 
a contract which binds a debtor and its creditors.”); In re Mako, Inc., 120 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. E.D. 
Okla. 1990) (“A Chapter 11 Plan . . . is . . . a contract between a debtor and the creditors of the 
bankruptcy estate.”).  
39 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2012) (requiring only seven items be included in a plan). Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, a reorganization plan must determine “the classes that are not impaired; identify 
treatment for the classes established; treat all class members identically; provide a means for its 
implementation; not require the issuance of nonvoting equity securities; and be consistent with the 
interests of creditors, equity holders, and public policy in the manner by which the reorganized debtor’s 
officers and directors are selected.” See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. 
40 Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. 
41 Id.  
42 To solicit creditor votes, a plan proponent must distribute ballots, certain required notices, and a 
disclosure statement approved by a court. Alan N. Resnick, Subordination Agreement Provisions 
Shifting Chapter 11 Voting Rights: Can the Seniors Disenfranchise the Juniors?, 118 BANKING L.J. 
297, 299 (2001) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)). 
43 Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. 
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2012). 
45 The Bankruptcy Code’s rigorous disclosure requirements “emphasize the importance of the 
voting process.” See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. For example, § 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
requires the plan proponent (generally, the debtor) to achieve court approval of a disclosure statement 
that contains “adequate information” before soliciting creditor votes on a proposed reorganization plan. 
See § 1125. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code requires that “sufficient information about the debtor’s 
financial condition and the anticipated effect of the proposed [reorganization] plan must be 
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at the negotiating table, and it represents a creditor’s only opportunity to 
stop a plan of reorganization from being pushed through the bankruptcy 
process. 
A plan can be confirmed in two ways. The most commonly used 
method to confirm a plan of reorganization is consensual confirmation, 
which requires a plan proponent to obtain the consent of each class of 
claims.46 Section 1129(a) sets forth the requirements for consensual 
confirmation.47 Although unanimous consent from each class of claims is 
required for consensual confirmation, not all creditors or interested parties 
must support a proposed plan of reorganization for it be confirmed.48 
Chapter 11 requires that creditors be grouped into classes based on certain 
characteristics of their claims.49 If a majority of the creditors in a class 
approve of the proposed plan, then that class is deemed to have accepted 
the plan.50 This remains true regardless of whether there are any recalcitrant 
creditors within that class. Although this requirement may at first glance 
seem harsh to creditors, in actuality it is not as harsh as it initially appears. 
Because Chapter 11 requires claims to be substantially similar in order to 
be classified together,51 plan proponents are still required to obtain the 
approval of a majority of that recalcitrant creditor’s similarly situated 
fellow class members before it can push its plan through. 
If a plan proponent is unable to achieve consensual confirmation, it 
may still be able to achieve confirmation through the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“cramdown” process, which represents the second way a plan can be 
confirmed. Section 1129(b) sets forth the requirements for a cramdown. A 
cramdown permits a plan to be confirmed over the objections of one or 
more classes of impaired claims.52 In other words, it allows a plan to be 
confirmed even if § 1129(a)(8), which requires all impaired classes to 
accept the plan, has not been satisfied. With the exception of § 1128(a)(8), 
however, the remaining requirements outlined in § 1129(a) must still be 
 
disseminated to enable creditors and interest holders to make an informed choice whether to accept or 
reject the plan.” Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5–6. 
46 See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 
60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 69 (1986). 
47 See § 1129(a). Most bankruptcy courts have adopted a literalist approach to determining whether 
the requirements of § 1129(a) have been met, meaning if a proposed reorganization plan fails to meet 
any of the requirements outlined in § 1129(a), courts will not confirm it. See Cieri et al., supra note 32, 
at 11. Certain courts have even expressed the view that “the provisions of Chapter 11 require[] [them] 
to discharge [their] ‘mandatory independent duty’ to decide whether the plan of reorganization 
complied with each of the requirements for confirmation prior to approving the plan.” Id. (quoting In re 
MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 225 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992), appeal dismissed, 139 B.R. 820 (S.D. 
Tex. 1992)). 
48 Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. 
49 See § 1122(a). 
50 See id. § 1126(c). 
51 See id. § 1122(a). 
52 See Booth, supra note 46, at 69. 
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met before a cramdown will be permitted under § 1129(b).53 Cramdown 
also requires that a plan be “fair and equitable” and not unfairly 
discriminate against dissenting creditor classes.54 Because confirmation of a 
plan by cramdown often involves complex valuation issues and 
uncertainties, it is generally more advantageous for creditors and interested 
parties to work together on the terms of a proposed reorganization plan and 
to reach a consensual settlement rather than to try to rely on the cramdown 
process under § 1129(b).55 
B. Section 1129(a)(10) 
Section 1129(a)(10) is one of the requirements that must be met in 
order for a reorganization plan to be confirmed under Chapter 11. It states 
that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of 
claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.”56 Section 
1129(a)(10), at a minimum, requires one impaired class of claims to vote in 
favor of the reorganization plan before it can be confirmed.57 
Congress specifically added this requirement in 1978 when it 
overhauled the Bankruptcy Code, and it did so in part to encourage 
consensus in the reorganization process among interested parties.58 
Following the 1978 changes, courts began to disagree over whether the 
accepting class had to be impaired to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) or whether an 
unimpaired class would be enough.59 This disagreement caused Congress to 
act a second time in 1984, to clarify that only an impaired accepting class 
would be sufficient.60 Section 1129(a)(10) now serves as an important 
protective measure for creditors by requiring the plan proponent, which is 
typically the debtor, to obtain the support of at least some creditors whose 
claims are affected by the plan before it can achieve confirmation.61 Section 
 
53 Id. 
54 § 1129(b). 
55 See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 6. 
56 § 1129(a)(10). Insiders are excluded from this determination. Id. 
57 A claim is impaired under the code unless the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and 
contractual rights to which [the] claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest.” Id. 
§ 1124(1). 
58 See Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification 
or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 311–13 (1992) (explaining that 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(10) was added in 1978, and that Congress, in 1984, made explicit the requirement that the 
accepting class be an impaired class). 
59 See id. 
60 See Richard M. Cieri, et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm a Plan of 
Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part II), 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115, 146–
47 (1994); Meltzer, supra note 58, at 311–13. 
61 See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14. Congress’s exclusion of the “insider” vote in 
satisfying § 1129(a)(10) further supports the idea that this section plays a protective function in 
cramdowns. 
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1129(a)(10) also operates as a powerful safeguard for creditors. It protects 
creditors from the debtor, who enjoys significant exclusivity and control 
advantages throughout the plan process,62 and it protects creditors from a 
plan proponent’s use of the cramdown powers granted by § 1129(b).63 Even 
in a cramdown, § 1129(a)(10) must still be satisfied. Thus, regardless of 
how confirmation is obtained, § 1129(a)(10) plays a critical role in the 
confirmation process by protecting creditors’ interests and by serving as an 
important creditor counterbalance against what is often a very powerful 
debtor. 
C. Distinguishing Joint Administration from Substantive Consolidation 
Joint administration and substantive consolidation are two frequently 
used administrative rules of convenience in Chapter 11 proceedings. 
Because Chapter 11 petitions are often filed by large corporations, which 
own numerous affiliated entities, today’s bankruptcy proceedings tend to 
be very complex. When these large corporations file under Chapter 11, 
each affiliated entity is required to file a separate bankruptcy petition and to 
have its own Chapter 11 case.64 Administrative rules of convenience, like 
joint administration and substantive consolidation, allow the parties and the 
court to combine the related cases in specific ways to eliminate some of 
these complexities and to ease the administrative burden on the parties 
throughout the bankruptcy process. 
Joint administration allows multiple related cases—such as the cases 
of a debtor and its subsidiaries—to be consolidated and placed on a single 
docket.65 It does not substantively abridge the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code in any way, meaning it does not alter creditors’ rights or 
the bankruptcy estate of each debtor.66 Instead, it merely serves as a tool of 
 
62 Id. For example, after a Chapter 11 petition is filed, the debtor is given the exclusive right to 
propose a plan of reorganization for the first 120 days. See § 1121(b) (“[O]nly the debtor may file a 
plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”). 
63 See Cieri et al., supra note 60, at 147 n.178 (citing In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Section 1129(a)(10) operates as a statutory gatekeeper barring access to cram 
down where there is absent even one impaired class accepting the plan.”), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)); see also Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14 (footnote omitted) (“The intention of 
Congress was to reverse cases before the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, where cramdown was permitted 
without any consent of creditors.”). 
64 Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 18. 
65 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 Advisory Committee’s Notes (“Joint administration as distinguished 
from consolidation may include combining the estates by using a single docket for the matters occurring 
in the administration, including the listing of filed claims, the combining of notices to creditors of the 
different estates, and the joint handling of other purely administrative matters that may aid in expediting 
the cases and rendering the process less costly.” (emphasis added)). 
66 See, e.g., Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Joint 
administration does not affect the substantive rights of either the debtor or his or her creditors.”). 
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convenience that helps expedite cases and lower administrative costs.67 The 
estates of each debtor remain separate and distinct, and creditors are able to 
reach only the assets of the specific debtor with which they have a claim. 
Substantive consolidation, by contrast, does substantively abridge the 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and, more importantly, the rights of 
the parties involved.68 Substantive consolidation is not provided for in the 
Bankruptcy Code, but is instead a federal common law construct that 
emanates from equity.69 It allows a bankruptcy court to combine the estates 
of multiple debtors—each of which are separate legal entities—to pool the 
debtors’ assets, and to force each debtor’s creditors to become creditors in 
the consolidated estate.70 In essence, it morphs separate creditor claims 
against separate debtors into claims against a single surviving entity.71 
When implemented, substantive consolidation significantly affects 
creditors’ rights in the bankruptcy process and often prejudices creditors by 
causing them to recover less than they would have absent consolidation.72 
For example, if the estate of a debtor with a higher asset-to-debt ratio is 
substantively consolidated with the estate of a debtor with a lower ratio, 
then the creditors of the former debtor will receive less in the combined 
bankruptcy proceeding than they would have in an unconsolidated 
proceeding.73 In this way, substantive consolidation, unlike joint 
administration, restructures and substantively abridges the requirements of 
the Bankruptcy Code and creditors’ rights. 
This distinction between joint administration and substantive 
consolidation is important not only because the bankruptcy courts have 
relied on these means of consolidation to apply § 1129(a)(10) in multi-
debtor Chapter 11 cases, but also because the correct interpretation of 
§ 1129(a)(10) depends on whether either or both are being used in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
67 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 Advisory Committee’s Notes; see also Chaisanguanthum, supra 
note 25, at 18 (“Joint administration is a tool of convenience. For example, if there are fifteen entities, it 
obviates the need to file the same motion fifteen times.”).  
68 In re I.R.C.C., Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Joint administration is 
distinguished from substantive consolidation because it is simply a procedural consolidation designed 
for administrative convenience and does not affect the substantive rights of the creditors of the different 
estates.”); In re Farmers & Feeders, Inc., No. 93-30770, 1994 WL 1887489, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.D. Jan. 
10, 1994) (“The basic and most significant difference between substantive consolidation and joint 
administration is that joint administration does not affect the substantive rights of creditors and other 
interested parties since the estate of each debtor remains separate and distinct.” (emphasis omitted)). 
69 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005). 
70 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Substantive consolidation . . . treats separate legal 
entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets and 
liabilities . . . .”). 
71 See In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005). 
72 See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205. 
73 See In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). 
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II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF § 1129(a)(10) 
There exists limited legal precedent on whether § 1129(a)(10) 
demands a “per-debtor” or “per-plan” approach; to date, only a few 
bankruptcy courts have addressed the issue. This Part details the current 
state of the law by first discussing those cases applying the per-debtor 
approach and then discussing those cases applying the per-plan approach. 
A. The Per-Debtor Approach 
The first court to formally discuss and adopt the per-debtor approach 
to § 1129(a)(10) was the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware in its 2011 In re Tribune Co. decision.74 In In re Tribune Co., two 
competing jointly administered reorganization plans were proposed, neither 
of which received the affirmative vote of an impaired class for each debtor 
entity included in the joint plan.75 Because the parties had agreed only to 
joint administration and not substantive consolidation, the bankruptcy court 
was forced to determine whether § 1129(a)(10) required each debtor that 
was part of a joint plan to have at least one class of impaired creditors vote 
to accept the plan, or only one impaired accepting class for all of the 
debtors subject to the joint plan of reorganization.76 
The court first looked to the statutory construction of § 1129(a)(10).77 
The court considered the effect of the Bankruptcy Code’s own statutory 
rules of construction,78 specifically § 102(7)79 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which states that “the singular includes the plural.”80 Under this rule, the 
court concluded that § 1129(a)(10)’s reference to “plan” in the singular was 
not, on its own, a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that any less than 
all debtors must satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a) in a multi-debtor 
case.81 The court also analyzed § 1129(a)(10) in context,82 concluding that 
because § 1129 included many plan confirmation requirements that had to 
be satisfied by each debtor—e.g., § 1129(a)(7) (best interests of creditors 
test), § 1129(b) (cramdown), § 1129(a)(3) (good faith requirement)—so too 
did § 1129(a)(10).83 
 
74 464 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
This case is especially important given the large number of federal Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that are 
filed in the District of Delaware. 
75 Id. at 180. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 182. 
78 Id. 
79 See 11 U.S.C. § 102(7) (2012). 
80 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 183. 
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Turning to the substance of the competing plans, the court determined 
that because both plans failed to provide for substantive consolidation84 of 
the debtors, each joint plan actually “consist[ed] of a separate plan for each 
Debtor.”85 The court distinguished its case from prior cases where a per-
plan approach was adopted, such as In re SGPA, Inc.86 and In re Enron 
Corp.,87 on substantive consolidation grounds.88 
The court held that each debtor participating in a multi-debtor, jointly 
administered plan of reorganization must satisfy § 1129(a)(10) unless all of 
the debtors are substantively consolidated under the joint plan.89 
Shortly after deciding In re Tribune Co., the Delaware Bankruptcy 
Court reaffirmed its per-debtor interpretation in In re JER/Jameson Mezz 
Borrower II, LLC (In re JER/Jameson).90 There, JER/Jameson Mezz 
Borrower II, LLC (Mezz II) filed for Chapter 11 protection the day before 
its sole creditor, Colony, was to participate in a foreclosure auction.91 At 
the foreclosure auction, Colony intended to sell its only asset: Mezz II’s 
membership interest in Mezz I.92 
Colony, the sole creditor, sought to dismiss Mezz II’s bankruptcy case 
for bad faith, stating that it was “a litigation tactic designed to forestall its 
efforts to foreclose on its collateral.”93 Colony also argued that Mezz II had 
no rehabilitation prospects as a going concern because the entity had no 
active operations or direct employees.94 
Relying on In re Tribune Co., the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the 
case.95 The judge agreed with Colony that there was no realistic chance of 
reorganization because no plan of reorganization could be confirmed absent 
Colony’s consent.96 The judge reasoned that because substantive 
consolidation was absent, Mezz II would need at least one impaired 
consenting class to confirm a plan;97 but, because Colony was the sole 
 
84 See supra Part I.C for a discussion on substantive consolidation. 
85 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182. 
86 No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2001). See infra Part II.B 
for discussion of this case. 
87 No. 01-16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004). See infra Part II.B for 
discussion of this case. 
88 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 181. 
89 Id. at 183. 
90 461 B.R. 293 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
91 Id. at 300. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 299, 301. 
95 Id. at 302, 308. 
96 Id. at 302. 
97 Id. 
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creditor entitled to vote on the plan, no other impaired consenting creditors 
existed.98 Mezz II needed Colony’s consent for confirmation. 
Collectively, In re Tribune Co. and In re JER/Jameson stand for the 
proposition that, absent substantive consolidation or consent, each debtor 
involved in a jointly administered plan must separately satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(10). 
B. The Per-Plan Approach 
The earliest case cited in support of the per-plan interpretation of 
§ 1129(a)(10) is the 2001 decision In re SGPA, Inc. by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.99 SGPA and ten of its 
subsidiaries and affiliates filed Chapter 11 petitions.100 The eleven debtors 
agreed to joint administration but not substantive consolidation.101 After the 
debtors proposed a reorganization plan, the subordinated bondholders 
involved in the case—who were an impaired class under the proposed 
plan—filed an objection to confirmation in which they argued for the 
adoption of the per-debtor approach. Under the bondholders’ interpretation, 
the proposed plan would not be confirmable because only one of the eleven 
debtors had received the necessary vote from an impaired class.102 
The court overruled the bondholders’ objection, finding that “in a joint 
plan of reorganization it is not necessary to have an impaired class of 
creditors of each Debtor vote to accept the Plan.”103 The court noted that 
“[w]hether these Debtors were substantively consolidated or jointly 
administered would have no adverse [effect] on the Subordinated 
Bondholders.”104 Accordingly, the court rejected the bondholders’ 
argument and held that the reorganization plan complied with 
§ 1129(a)(10) because “at least one class of impaired creditors . . . accepted 
the Plan.”105 
Although some courts view In re SGPA, Inc. as having adopted the 
per-plan interpretation solely because the result would have been the same 
if the parties had agreed to substantive consolidation, the language of the 
decision is unclear on whether or not this was the primary driving factor in 
its decision. Because the court did not focus on this issue, In re SGPA, Inc. 
 
98 Id. 
99 No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2001).  
100 Id. at *1. 
101 Id. at *9–10. 
102 Id. at *13. 
103 Id. at *21. 
104 Id. at *22 (emphasis omitted). 
105 Id. 
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more strongly supports the per-plan interpretation than it does the per-
debtor interpretation.106 
In 2004, a few years after In re SGPA, Inc. was decided, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York similarly decided 
in In re Enron Corp. that § 1129(a)(10) could be satisfied on a per-plan 
basis.107 There, 177 different debtors had filed Chapter 11 petitions.108 
However, unlike In re SGPA, Inc., the debtors had agreed to both joint 
administration and substantive consolidation.109 
The court began by considering the plain meaning of the statute.110 
Relying on In re SGPA, Inc., the court found that “[t]he plain language and 
inherent fundamental policy behind § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that an affirmative vote of one impaired class under a plan is 
sufficient to satisfy § 1129(a)(10).”111 
The court also found that the parties’ agreement to substantively 
consolidate supported the per-plan interpretation of § 1129(a)(10).112 The 
court stated, “[T]he requirements of section 1129(a)(10) are satisfied as to 
each of the Debtors lacking an impaired accepting class because those 
Debtors are part of the global compromise [i.e., are substantively 
consolidated] embodied in the Plan.”113 
Thus, in reaching its conclusion that a per-plan approach satisfied the 
requirement of § 1129(a)(10), the court relied on both the plain language of 
the statute as well as the fact that the debtors had agreed to both joint 
administration and substantive consolidation of their Chapter 11 
proceedings. As discussed below, use of the per-plan approach in 
circumstances like those presented in In re Enron Corp., where the parties 
agree in advance to substantively consolidate, is acceptable because the 
parties have consented to the alteration of their substantive rights and 
effectively eliminated the threat typically posed by the adoption of the per-
plan approach—disenfranchisement of an impaired creditor’s right to vote 
without that creditor’s consent. 
In its next case, however, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York expanded its In re Enron Corp. ruling well beyond 
acceptable limits. In In re Charter Communications, the Bankruptcy Court 
 
106 For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Tribune Co. distinguished In re SGPA, Inc. on this 
fact. In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 182 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 




110 Id. at *234–35. 
111 Id. at *235. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
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for the Southern District of New York not only reaffirmed its view that 
§ 1129(a)(10) can be satisfied on a per-plan basis, but also expanded its 
application to all jointly administered cases even in the absence of 
substantive consolidation.114 Like in In re SGPA, Inc., the debtors had 
agreed to joint administration of their Chapter 11 proceedings but not 
substantive consolidation.115 
The court relied on In re Enron Corp. and In re SGPA, Inc. in reaching 
its conclusion that “it is appropriate to test compliance with section 
1129(a)(10) on a per-plan basis, not, as the . . . Noteholders argue, on a per-
debtor basis.”116 The court indicated that because the debtors had agreed to 
joint administration, only one impaired accepting class was necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10).117 The court ultimately found that 
regardless of whether the debtors had agreed to substantive consolidation, 
§ 1129(a)(10) allowed a per-plan interpretation when plans were jointly 
administered. 
Although largely viewed as dicta,118 this decision is significant because 
it indicates that the per-plan interpretation is applicable to all jointly 
administered Chapter 11 proceedings regardless of whether the parties 
agree to substantive consolidation. The court viewed agreement to joint 
administration as sufficient to alter the rights of the creditors, a holding that 
stands in contrast to In re Tribune Co. and In re JER/Jameson. 
The most recent case to consider how to interpret § 1129(a)(10) is In 
re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.119 There, the court explicitly rejected 
In re Tribune Co.’s analysis and instead adopted the per-plan interpretation 
articulated in In re SGPA, Inc. and In re Enron Corp.120 To distinguish the 
case from In re Tribune Co., the In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc. 
judge primarily relied on factual distinctions,121 noting that even if In re 
Tribune Co. were correct on its facts, its analysis did not work in this 
instance because In re Transwest Resort Properties Inc. only had one 
proposed plan for all debtors, whereas In re Tribune Co. had separate 
proposed plans for each debtor.122 The judge also indicated that even 
 
114 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 266 




118 In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 182 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011); Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 19. 
119 See Transcript of Record, In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., No. 10-37134 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
Dec. 19, 2011) (court’s ruling on the record confirming third amended and restated joint plan of 
reorganization). This is the only case to have ruled on this issue subsequent to In re Tribune Co. and In 
re JER/Jameson. 
120 See id. at 5. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 6–7. 
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though the parties did not explicitly agree to substantive consolidation, the 
result in this case, like in In re SGPA, Inc., would be the same even if they 
had, meaning the creditors would have been no worse had substantive 
consolidation been adopted.123 Accordingly, the judge determined that the 
per-plan approach was appropriate and that the requirements of 
§ 1129(a)(10) “are met by having at least one impaired class vote for the 
plan.”124 
In sum, the few courts that have interpreted § 1129(a)(10) in this 
regard have adopted divergent approaches. In re SGPA, Inc. and its 
progeny focused on the presence (or deemed presence) of substantive 
consolidation and statutory history to determine that § 1129(a)(10) should 
be interpreted on a per-plan basis. In re Charter Communications found the 
presence of joint administration alone to be sufficient to allow 
§ 1129(a)(10) to be applied on a per-plan basis. In re Tribune Co. also 
focused on the statutory history and broad purpose of § 1129(a)(10) but 
came to the opposite conclusion, holding that § 1129(a)(10) should be 
interpreted on a per-debtor basis absent a strict directive of substantive 
consolidation. Such divergent approaches call for clarity in this area. 
III. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
Courts should resolve the confusion surrounding the application of 
§ 1129(a)(10) by adopting the per-debtor approach outlined in In re 
Tribune Co. In jointly administered (but not substantively consolidated) 
Chapter 11 proceedings, § 1129(a)(10) should be satisfied only if at least 
one impaired class of claims under each debtor votes to accept the 
proposed reorganization plan. In contrast, if the parties agree to substantive 
consolidation, then the per-plan interpretation should be used because the 
parties will have effectively agreed to combine their estates and to accept 
an alteration of their rights. 
This Part discusses why the per-debtor approach is the better 
interpretation. Part III.A illustrates why the per-debtor interpretation more 
accurately aligns with the statutory construction of Chapter 11. Part III.B 
argues that the per-debtor approach is preferable for two reasons: first, it 
better aligns with the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown procedures, and 
second, it ensures that the principles of substantive consolidation and joint 
administration are not conflated. Finally, Part III.C discusses the 
implications of adopting a per-debtor approach. 
 
123 See id. at 7. 
124 See id. at 8. 
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A. Statutory Construction of the Bankruptcy Code Supports the  
Per-Debtor Interpretation 
When analyzing statutory language, a thorough analysis requires 
examination of the plain meaning of the statute as well as the larger context 
of the relevant statutory language.125 Here, close examination ultimately 
supports adopting a per-debtor interpretation of § 1129(a)(10). 
Section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code outlines relevant rules of 
construction to be used throughout the Code for interpreting statutory 
language.126 Relevant here is § 102(7), which provides that “the singular 
includes the plural.”127 Section 1129(a)(10) states, “If a class of claims is 
impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under 
the plan has accepted the plan . . . .”128 Section 1129(a)(10) requires at least 
one class of impaired claims under a plan to approve the plan before it can 
be confirmed. 
Using the § 102(7) rule of construction, the In re Tribune Co. court 
found that § 1129(a)(10)’s reference to “plan” in the singular was an 
insufficient basis upon which “to conclude that, in a multiple debtor case, 
only one debtor—or any number fewer than all debtors—must satisfy 
[§ 1129(a)(10)’s] standard.”129 In multiple debtor cases that are jointly 
administered, but not substantively consolidated, the substantive rights of 
the parties are not altered (or at least are not supposed to be).130 Joint 
administration merely allows related debtors to work out their 
reorganizations in a single proceeding. Each debtor remains a separate 
entity, and its creditors’ claims remain entirely distinct from the claims of 
other debtors’ creditors. The practical effect of not being substantively 
consolidated is that “each joint plan actually consists of a separate plan for 
each [d]ebtor.”131 The ability to pluralize “plan” under § 102(7) directly 
supports this view, indicating that § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement 
encompasses more than just approval for a singular plan. Even if a single 
plan is proposed for all debtors, as occurred in In re Transwest Resort 
Properties, Inc., the result should not change when substantive 
 
125 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); see also, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (“The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language of the 
statute itself. . . . The strong presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional 
intent is rebutted only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”).  
126 See 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
127 Id. § 102(7). When adding § 102(7) to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress clarified that it was a 
necessary addition to the Rules of Construction because the Bankruptcy Code “uses only the singular, 
even when the item in question most often is found in plural quantities.” See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 
316 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273. 
128 § 1129(a)(10). 
129 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182. 
130 See supra Part I.C. 
131 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1374 
consolidation is absent. If separate plans did not exist for each debtor in a 
jointly administered proceeding then the substantive rights of the parties 
would undoubtedly be altered, for one impaired class of creditors would be 
able to speak for another impaired class of creditors with claims against an 
entirely different debtor. Because a creditor’s ability to vote is its most 
powerful substantive right, eliminating this right by reading plan singularly 
in the absence of substantive consolidation would effectively mute that 
creditor. To avoid this result, § 1129(a)(10) must be read, as § 102(7) 
allows it to be, to require the use of the per-debtor approach. 
Courts should also perform a contextual, in pari materia analysis of 
§ 1129(a)(10), as the court in In re Tribune Co. did.132 The per-debtor 
interpretation receives even greater support from reading § 1129(a)(10) in 
conjunction with the other subsections of § 1129(a) than it does from 
analyzing the plain meaning of the section on its own.133 First, consider 
§ 1129(a)(1), which requires that the reorganization plan comply with the 
applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.134 It is well established that 
§ 1129(a)(1) cannot be satisfied if not all debtors meet it, even in jointly 
administered bankruptcy proceedings.135 Likewise, § 1129(a)(3), which 
requires that the plan be proposed in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law, cannot be satisfied if not all debtors meet it.136 These 
sections illustrate a consistent principle of application: all debtors must 
meet each requirement under § 1129(a). Applying this principle to 
§ 1129(a)(10) would likewise require all debtors to meet it, meaning a per-
debtor approach would be the correct interpretation. 
Section 1129(a)(7) provides further guidance, particularly given its 
focus on the interests of impaired creditors. Section 1129(a)(7) embodies 
the “best interest of creditors” test, which addresses the treatment—what 
each class of claimants will receive in exchange for their pre-bankruptcy 
claims—required for “each impaired class”137 of creditors. The best interest 
 
132 See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (citation omitted) (stating that a 
“cardinal rule” of statutory construction is that “a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of 
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context”); Crédit Agricole Corporate & Inv. Bank v. Am. 
Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc. (In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc.), 637 F.3d 246, 255 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Supreme Court has indicated a reluctance to 
declare provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ambiguous . . . . [C]ourts [should] not be guided by a single 
sentence . . . , but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”). 
133 Section 1129(a) outlines the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan. 
134 Specifically, § 1129(a)(1) states, “The court shall confirm a plan only if [the] plan complies 
with the applicable provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) (2012). 
135 See Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183. 
136 See id. 
137 § 1129(a)(7); In re Draiman, 450 B.R. 777, 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Section 1129(a)(7) 
provides that each holder of an impaired claim who has rejected a plan must ‘receive or retain under the 
plan on account of such claim . . . property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less 
than the amount that such holder would so receive . . . if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . 
on such date.’” (quoting § 1129(a)(7))). 
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of creditors test requires that, with respect to each impaired class of claims, 
each holder of a claim has accepted the plan or will receive or retain 
property that is worth at least as much as the impaired class of claims 
would have received if the debtor were liquidated.138 For the analysis of 
§ 1129(a)(10), the most important fact is that the test applies to each 
individual creditor holding impaired claims, regardless of whether the class 
as a whole voted to accept the plan.139 Section 1129(a)(7) thus “cannot be 
read fairly other than as an entitlement to the prescribed treatment for every 
impaired class of creditors for each debtor [that] is part of a joint plan.”140 
This again signals the Bankruptcy Code’s focus on each individual debtor, 
rather than on the debtors as a whole.141 
For all of these reasons, under a strict statutory analysis, the per-debtor 
interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) is better than the per-plan interpretation 
because it more closely aligns with the Bankruptcy Code’s rules of 
construction and the other confirmation conditions outlined in § 1129(a). 
B. The Per-Debtor Approach as the Preferable Method 
The per-debtor approach is preferable to the per-plan approach 
because it preserves § 1129(a)(10)’s role as a protective measure against 
abuse of a cramdown when substantive consolidation is absent, and also 
because it ensures substantive consolidation and joint administration are 
not conflated. 
1. Section 1129(a)(10) as a Safeguard Against Abusive 
Cramdown.—A cramdown is a powerful remedy available to plan 
proponents and is arguably one of “the most significant and probable 
risk[s]” creditors face in Chapter 11.142 A cramdown, which is detailed in 
 
138 See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 49. 
139 Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441 n.13 
(1999) (“Section 1129(a)(7) provides that if the holder of a claim impaired under a plan of 
reorganization has not accepted the plan, then such holder must ‘receive . . . on account of such 
claim . . . property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that 
such holder would so receive . . . if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . on such date.’ The 
‘best interests’ test applies to individual creditors holding impaired claims, even if the class as a whole 
votes to accept the plan.” (quoting § 1129(a)(7))). 
140 Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183. 
141 The remainder of the requirements under § 1129(a) are boilerplate or inapplicable. Section 
1129(a)(2) is a boilerplate provision, as are § 1129(a)(4)–(5). Section 1129(a)(6) is not discussed 
because it “applies only if a regulatory commission has jurisdiction over rates charged by the debtor.” 
See Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 
39 BUS. LAW. 441, 448 (1984). Section 1129(a)(8) applies to each class of claims, which would lend 
further support to the use of § 1129(a)(10) under the per-debtor approach, but is not required to be met 
in order for a plan to be crammed down. See § 1129(b). Sections 1129(a)(9) and 1129(a)(11) are 
likewise inapplicable here. 
142 Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 10; see In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).  
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§ 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,143 forces confirmation of a 
reorganization plan over dissenting classes and forces those dissenting 
classes to rely on difficult court judgments, valuations, and 
determinations.144 Section 1129(a)(10) serves as a protective mechanism for 
creditors in avoiding a cramdown because it requires some measure of 
support from impaired creditors, or those whose rights are being altered by 
the reorganization plan, in order for a plan proponent’s reorganization plan 
to be confirmed.145 Before a plan proponent is able to force a cramdown 
and compel those objecting creditors to “shoulder the risks of error 
necessarily associated with a forced confirmation,” § 1129(a)(10) mandates 
that the plan proponent obtain the consent of at least one impaired creditor 
who would be hurt by the plan.146 This is § 1129(a)(10)’s underlying policy 
rationale, and it is important because there are many risks and uncertainties 
associated with a cramdown: confusion, delay, valuation, discount rates, 
and increased likelihood of liquidation due to adversarial posturing of 
parties.147 
Moreover, this underlying policy rationale is exactly what Congress 
intended for § 1129(a)(10). In 1984, when Congress amended 
§ 1129(a)(10) to clarify that it required the accepting class to be 
impaired,148 it did so in order to reverse the cases that had occurred prior to 
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code in which cramdowns were permitted without 
the consent of any creditor.149 The legislative history indicates that creditor 
consent, specifically impaired creditor consent, is a critical component to a 
successful Chapter 11 reorganization. This requirement appropriately 
 
143 See § 1129(b); ADLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 707 (“Section 1129(b) is invoked when a 
reorganization plan fails to garner the acceptance of all impaired classes of claims . . . and thus fails to 
satisfy § 1129(a)(8).”). For a detailed discussion of § 1129(b), see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 33, ¶ 1129.03, at 1129-63. 
144 See 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287. 
145 See id.; Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14.  
146 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287; see also In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I) Ltd. P’ship, 77 
B.R. 108, 112–13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (“[T]here must be some one other than the debtor, other 
than the insiders, and other than the target of the cram down, who cares enough about the reorganization 
and whose rights must also be considered to invoke the equitable grounds that justify resort to cram 
down.”).  
147 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287; see Booth, supra note 46, at 104–05. Booth also notes that 
“[a]ll of these risks and uncertainties may be avoided if the parties avert a cramdown. . . . [I]n most 
chapter 11 cases, it will be in the best interest of all the parties to reach a settlement and to consent to a 
plan under section 1129(a), rather than to resort to a cramdown under section 1129(b).” Booth, supra 
note 46, at 104-05.  
148 Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14; see also Cieri et al., supra note 60, at 146–47; Meltzer, 
supra note 58, at 311–13. 
149 See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14 (citing 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, 
¶ 1129.LH[7], at 1129-204). 
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balances the interests of both the debtor and the creditor, which is a key 
foundational principle underlying all bankruptcy proceedings.150 
If § 1129(a)(10)’s approval requirement is interpreted as per-plan in 
the absence of substantive consolidation, then its ability to safeguard 
creditors involved in joint plans of reorganization from a cramdown is for 
all practical purposes eliminated. Plan proponents—whether the debtor or 
creditors—could easily manipulate the proposed reorganization plan and 
ensure claims were classified in a way that would guarantee at least one 
impaired class from at least one debtor voted in favor of the plan.151 For 
example, a plan proponent could intentionally try to misclassify one or 
more claims,152 or isolate a secured creditor’s large deficiency claim into its 
own class so another impaired class of unsecured claims could vote in 
favor of the plan if the large deficiency claim does not.153 Likewise, a plan 
proponent could try to distribute lower payments to a class of unsecured 
creditors than the estate is otherwise capable of paying in order to create an 
“impaired” class.154 
If a plan proponent may structure the claims in a way that enables it to 
obtain the affirmative vote of at least one impaired class, then under a per-
plan interpretation, this vote would be sufficient to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) 
and allow the cramdown of the proposed plan on the remaining creditors, 
regardless of how they voted.155 In effect, this result allows an impaired 
creditor class from Debtor A to dictate the rights, values, and reorganization 
plan structure not only for the remaining creditors of Debtor A, but also for 
the creditors of Debtor B, Debtor C, Debtor D, and so on. Admittedly, even 
under the per-debtor approach a single impaired class is able to dictate the 
structure of a reorganization plan for all other impaired creditor classes 
under that single debtor. However, while this may be the reality of a 
cramdown for the creditors of a single debtor, adopting the per-plan 
approach for § 1129(a)(10) would exasperate that already alarming reality. 
The impaired creditors under the other debtors involved in the joint plan 
would lose substantive rights (most importantly, the value of their vote) in 
the bankruptcy process and essentially be stripped of their § 1129(a)(10) 
safeguard. Adoption of the per-plan approach for § 1129(a)(10) would also 
 
150 See id. 
151 This is particularly true given the unclear law surrounding artificial claims classifications. See 
Markell, supra note 13 (providing a historical and analytical analysis of claim classification under 
Chapter 11); Susan E. Trent & Mark A. Warsco, Buying Votes in Chapter 11, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
38 (2011). 
152 See 94 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 36 (2007).  
153 See 3 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE: FORECLOSURE WORKOUTS 
PROCEDURES § 29:58 (2006). Courts remain split over whether classifying claims in this way is 
acceptable or a bad faith classification by the debtor. Id.  
154 See 94 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 36.  
155 Cramdown can be particularly detrimental to secured lenders who are forced to risk “receiving 
debt-like compensation for taking equity-like risk.” See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 11. 
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effectively override any decision by the parties involved in the bankruptcy 
proceeding against substantive consolidation by forcing it upon the parties 
without any consideration of the balance of equities, as is normally 
required in order for substantive consolidation to be implemented. Courts 
must not disregard these rights or the practical effects that would result by 
choosing to adopt the per-plan approach instead of the per-debtor approach. 
Likewise, plan proponents can take advantage of the classification 
requirements under Chapter 11 to ensure § 1129(a)(10) is met. When 
classifying creditors, the Bankruptcy Code dictates in § 1122(a) that 
similarly situated creditors must be treated equally in a proposed plan of 
reorganization.156 However, many courts have interpreted this portion of the 
Code to effectively disenfranchise creditors who could otherwise block 
confirmation with a dissenting vote.157 Courts do this by reading the second 
portion of § 1122(a) to require only that claims classified together be 
substantially similar, not that all similarly situated claims be classified 
together.158 The result is that plan proponents are able to artificially 
gerrymander classes, so long as those claims that are actually classified 
together remain substantially similar, to ensure that at least one impaired 
class votes in favor of the plan in order to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 1129(a)(10). Because classes of claims must separately vote on whether 
to accept or reject a plan of reorganization, how claims are classified 
directly affects the integrity of the Chapter 11 voting process.159 When 
coupled with a per-plan interpretation, this ability to artificially impair 
claim classification—which occurs at the plan proponent’s discretion as 
creditors have no say unless they are the plan proponent—becomes much 
more powerful because plan proponents need only manipulate the classes 
for one debtor, rather than all debtors, to undermine the voting rights of all 
creditors in the case under Chapter 11. 
If § 1129(a)(10) is instead interpreted on a per-debtor basis, 
Congress’s intention to provide creditors with additional protection from 
cramdowns would be better served. Returning to the above example, under 
a per-debtor approach, the impaired class of Debtor A that voted in favor of 
the proposed plan would satisfy § 1129(a)(10) only in regard to Debtor A. 
The remaining debtors (e.g., Debtor B, Debtor C, and Debtor D) would 
each need their own impaired class of claims—assuming there were 
impaired classes—to vote in favor of the proposed plan in order for each of 
the debtors to meet § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement. This result ensures that all 
creditors retain their voting rights in the Chapter 11 proceeding regardless 
of whether they are involved in a jointly administered plan. 
 
156 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012); see also Meltzer, supra note 58, at 290. 
157 Meltzer, supra note 58, at 290. 
158 Id. 
159 See In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 282 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).  
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Overall, the per-debtor approach better protects the rights of creditors 
by ensuring that at least one impaired creditor from each debtor approves 
the proposed reorganization plan.160 If an agreement between debtor and 
creditor cannot be reached, then the debtor should not be allowed to cram 
down its desired plan of reorganization on creditors without clearing the 
necessary protective hurdles—one of which is substantive consolidation, 
another of which is supposed to be § 1129(a)(10). Neither substantive 
consolidation nor § 1129(a)(10) would retain its power under a per-plan 
interpretation. If no impaired creditors agree to the plan, a debtor should 
not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of a confirmation through cramdown 
by forcing acceptance upon the dissenting creditors.161 A lack of an 
accepting impaired class indicates that “the debtor has failed to negotiate 
effectively with its creditors [while] devising a reorganization plan.”162 
Ineffective negotiation should not be rewarded by a per-plan interpretation 
of § 1129(a)(10), particularly when creditors are facing the potential risks 
and consequences of a cramdown. 
2. Ensuring Joint Administration Does Not Equate to Substantive 
Consolidation.—Requiring that the per-debtor interpretation be 
used in jointly administered Chapter 11 proceedings when substantive 
consolidation is absent ensures that the corporate form is respected and the 
substantive rights of creditors are protected. Joint administration is viewed 
as a tool of convenience.163 It does not abridge the parties’ legal rights.164 
This is a well-established principle. Case law resoundingly dictates that 
joint administration does not alter substantive rights.165 Substantive 
consolidation, in contrast, is an equitable principle that does alter the 
substantive rights of the parties.166 
A per-plan interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) in the absence of 
substantive consolidation effectively conflates the two principles. It allows 
an impaired class of claims for one debtor to speak for the creditors of 
another debtor who are situated differently, have different rights and 
recoveries, and arguably have diametrically opposed interests.167 For 
 
160 See In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983). This result also closely 
aligns with the current trend among federal appellate courts to vindicate creditors’ rights in Chapter 11 
proceedings. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2005). 
161 Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. at 835 (“[I]t would not be equitable to impose acceptance of [a] 
plan upon the creditors by enforcing the debtor’s interest in confirmation of the plan through the 
cramdown authority.”). 
162 Id. 
163 See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 18 (providing an example of the convenience of joint 
administration: “[I]f there are fifteen entities, it obviates the need to file the same motion fifteen 
times”). 
164 See supra Part I.C. 
165 See supra Part I.C for further information on substantive consolidation and joint administration. 
166 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
167 See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 19. 
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example, creditors of a parent entity receive value through the equity of the 
parent entity’s subsidiaries; their interests are undoubtedly in significant 
opposition to the interests of the subsidiary’s creditors.168 Requiring 
§ 1129(a)(10) to be met at the individual debtor level in the absence of 
substantive consolidation will at a minimum better balance the control the 
plan proponent (typically, the debtors) has against the control the creditors 
have and provide courts with a more independent measure on valuation 
issues, which will allow bankruptcy court judges who are imperfect 
adjudicators of value reach a more accurate valuation result.169 
Conflating these two concepts, moreover, is particularly troubling 
because it alters those creditors’ rights while they are playing what is in 
essence a zero-sum game (i.e., all creditors are fighting over a fixed sum): 
the bankruptcy estate.170 Allowing the per-plan approach in jointly 
administered proceedings blatantly ignores both the substantive rights of 
the creditors and corporate separateness because it effectively combines 
separate creditor entities from multiple closely related debtors.171 Adopting 
a per-plan interpretation when substantive consolidation is absent—as 
occurred in In re Charter Communications and In re Transwest Resort 
Properties, Inc.172—would require precedent to be disregarded and the 
difference between joint administration and substantive consolidation to be 
ignored. Even if the result would be the same if substantive consolidation 
were imposed, as was indicated in In re SGPA, Inc. and In re Transwest 
Resort Properties, Inc., courts should not skip the analysis required for 
implementing substantive consolidation. It is specifically designed to 
ensure that the creditors’ and debtors’ rights are considered and equitably 
balanced. 
Only by following a per-debtor approach can the corporate form and 
substantive rights of the parties involved in the bankruptcy proceeding 
remain intact. The per-debtor approach ensures that the creditors of each 
debtor (or at least one impaired creditor of each debtor) retain meaningful 
protection and a say in how the proposed reorganization plan allocates and 
distributes value. This is critical because eliminating the value of an 
impaired creditor’s vote during the bankruptcy process in essence purges 
from that creditor one of the most important—if not the most important—
benefits it receives from the bankruptcy process, and it does it all for the 
benefit of the debtor, who already enjoys tremendous exclusivity and 
control advantages. 
 
168 Id. at 20.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. (“Allocating enterprise value [in a bankruptcy proceeding] is a zero-sum proposition . . . .”). 
171 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2005). 
172 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of In re Charter Communications and In re Transwest 
Resort Properties, Inc. 
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Given the implications a per-plan approach would have on a creditor’s 
ability to safeguard itself from a cramdown, as well as its disregard for a 
creditor’s substantive rights, it should not be adopted. Instead, courts 
should adopt the per-debtor approach, which preserves § 1129(a)(10)’s 
safeguarding role—unless the parties agree otherwise through substantive 
consolidation—and ensures creditors are able to continue enjoying those 
rights granted to them in the bankruptcy process. 
3. The Policies and Principles Underlying Chapter 11.—The 
policies and principles underlying Chapter 11 support the adoption of the 
per-debtor approach. The primary goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcies are to 
provide the bankrupt with a fresh start and to maximize the value of the 
bankruptcy estate so the highest value of assets is available to creditors.173 
The per-debtor approach advances both of these interests. 
The per-debtor approach aids the debtor in obtaining that fresh start by 
clarifying debtor rights at the start of the Chapter 11 process. If a debtor 
believes a per-plan approach is necessary to ensure successful 
rehabilitation, then that debtor now knows substantive consolidation must 
be formally obtained. Because the substantive consolidation determination 
requires a bankruptcy court to analyze the necessity of consolidation for a 
successful reorganization and the actual expectations of the parties 
involved, the court will be forced to determine whether such an approach is 
truly appropriate by balancing the various interests of the affected parties, 
including the debtor, its creditors, and its employees.174 This balancing is a 
critical part of the bankruptcy process175 and something that should be 
enforced throughout the substantive consolidation decisionmaking process. 
Additionally, by adopting a per-debtor approach, debtors will be able 
to more easily manage the bankruptcy process because the formal adoption 
of the per-debtor approach eliminates any confusion surrounding the 
interpretation of § 1129(a)(10). Although this could also be achieved by 
adopting the per-plan approach, the per-plan approach does not accurately 
follow the language of § 1129(a)(10) and compromises the explicit 
directive of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Adopting the per-debtor approach in jointly administered proceedings 
also helps maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. It ensures that 
 
173 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1984) (noting that one of the primary 
goals of Chapter 11 is the maximization of the value of the bankruptcy estate); 7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4; Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering 
Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 417 (1998). 
174 See, e.g., Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211 (“In our Court what must be proven (absent consent) 
concerning the entities for whom substantive consolidation is sought is that (i) prepetition they 
disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and 
treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that 
separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.”). 
175 See Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527. 
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debtors with higher asset-to-debt ratios are not combined with debtors that 
have lower ratios unless their assets are actually substantively 
commingled.176 The resulting loss from the bankruptcy process, then, is as 
minimal as possible. Creditors will face lower asset-to-debt ratios only 
when their expectations appropriately support such a result. 
C. Implications of Adopting a Per-Debtor Interpretation 
Adopting the per-debtor interpretation for § 1129(a)(10) will 
inevitably have an impact on how Chapter 11 proceedings are conducted. 
For example, because companies today are often structured in complex 
ways with many affiliated companies and bankruptcy-remote (special 
purpose) entities, the per-debtor approach could prevent these companies 
from cramming down a reorganization plan absent substantive 
consolidation and make the reorganization process more difficult, costly, 
and time consuming.177 These cost implications, however, are insufficient 
on their own to overpower the protection of creditor rights provided by the 
per-debtor approach. Corporations filing under Chapter 11 tend to have 
more resources—e.g., internal legal and finance departments—that allow 
them to obtain a better understanding of the potential risks associated with 
the bankruptcy process and with debt.178 Corporations, as debtors, also have 
greater control over the bankruptcy process itself, which allows them to 
better control and minimize costs throughout the process, particularly as 
compared to creditors. As a result, the cost impact is unpersuasive as a 
rationale for allowing the per-plan approach to be adopted over the per-
debtor approach. 
Adopting the per-debtor approach may also cause creditors to object 
more frequently to reorganization plans that incorporate a per-plan 
scheme.179 This could cause companies entering bankruptcy to reconsider 
the debtors they wish to place in bankruptcy.180 It may also cause 
companies entering bankruptcy to seek substantive consolidation at the 
onset of the bankruptcy process to circumvent the per-debtor requirement 
 
176 See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211. 
177 Gary E. Axelrod et al., New Challenges for Real Estate Restructurings, LAW360 (Sept. 11, 
2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/law-360-real-estate-restructurings; see Jared 
S. Roach, Jointly Administered Plans Must Obtain Impaired Class Approval ‘Per Debtor’ Rather than 
‘Per Plan,’ COM. RESTRUCTURING & BANKR. NEWSL. (Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, P.A.), June 2012, 
at 3, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/5eb8589d-c5b2-48e3-81e9-8533a73b
5bf4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b28e4949-a14d-4e4c-bdd0-9e60915744f2/crab0612%5B1%
5D.pdf. 
178 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-148 (“[The cost-
minimizing] rationale, while not absent from chapter 11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter 
11 cases.”). 
179 See Axelrod et al., supra note 177.  
180 See id.; Roach, supra note 177.  
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and effectively impose the per-plan interpretation.181 Requiring companies 
to consider substantive consolidation from the beginning is a good thing 
because it forces the courts to focus on the best interests of all parties at the 
start of the process and it forces the debtor to consider how best to handle 
the bankruptcy process. 
The per-debtor interpretation will also likely force debtors and plan 
proponents to develop new methodologies and negotiating strategies for 
obtaining the necessary consent of an impaired voting class.182 Today, 
jointly administered reorganization plans, which are used for the 
convenience of the parties, usually propose just one distribution scheme.183 
The structure of that distribution scheme is often designed without regard 
for where the debtor’s assets and liabilities are located.184 This structure 
will not be successful under the per-debtor interpretation. However, this 
can be easily remedied once debtors (or other plan proponents) know that 
the per-debtor approach will be used, because they can adjust the structure 
of the plan at the beginning of the bankruptcy process to ensure it 
appropriately addresses all parties involved. 
Despite any possible negative ramifications, the per-debtor approach is 
still preferable over the per-plan approach. As the In re Tribune Co. court 
stated, “[C]onvenience alone is not [a] sufficient reason to disturb the rights 
of impaired classes of creditors of a debtor not meeting confirmation 
standards.”185 The Bankruptcy Code is designed to benefit both debtors and 
creditors. The per-debtor approach better achieves this goal. Assuming the 
per-debtor interpretation is adopted, parties will need to focus on consensus 
earlier in the process and act more aggressively in attempting to achieve it 
in order to overcome the hurdles imposed by § 1129(a)(10).186 But this 
additional effort is not without good cause. The per-debtor approach better 
protects the interests of the creditors by more accurately balancing the 
distribution of bargaining power between the debtors and the creditors. A 
better distribution of power makes the negotiation process more meaningful 
and ensures that debtors and creditors work together to reach the best 
reorganization solution possible, which is the underlying objective of 
Chapter 11. The Bankruptcy Code’s spirit should not be quashed by the 
adoption of a per-plan interpretation. 
 
181 See Axelrod et al., supra note 177. 
182 See id.; Roach, supra note 177.  
183 See Axelrod et al., supra note 177. This would be similar to the plan proposed in In re 
Transwest Resort Properties, Inc. See Transcript of Record, In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., No. 10-
37134 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2011) (court’s ruling on the record confirming third amended and 
restated joint plan of reorganization); see also supra Part I.C. 
184 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
185 See id. 
186 See Axelrod et al., supra note 177. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Comment sheds light on the different approaches bankruptcy 
courts are using to interpret § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. Some 
courts have adopted a per-plan approach, while others have adopted a per-
debtor approach. This lack of consistency in applying § 1129(a)(10) has 
left debtors and creditors with unclear legal precedent and a lack of clarity 
on how to best structure their reorganization plans. Such uncertainty only 
adds to the complexity of Chapter 11 reorganizations and to the time it 
takes to complete bankruptcy proceedings. 
Adopting the per-debtor approach finds support in several areas. The 
per-debtor approach more accurately aligns with the meaning and context 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, the per-debtor interpretation better 
coincides with the other subsections of § 1129(a). The per-debtor approach 
also allows § 1129(a)(10) to retain its safeguard mechanism in relation to 
cramdowns. This result helps creditors retain the protections granted to 
them throughout the bankruptcy process and is more in line with 
Congress’s intention in adopting § 1129(a)(10). Finally, the per-debtor 
interpretation ensures that two very different legal principles—substantive 
consolidation and joint administration—are not conflated and the 
substantive rights of creditors disregarded. 
The benefits of the per-debtor approach far outweigh the benefits of 
the per-plan approach and the costs of implementation. Courts should adopt 
the per-debtor interpretation for § 1129(a)(10) when dealing with jointly 
administered, but not substantively consolidated, Chapter 11 
reorganizations. 
 
